A Course in Strategic Queueing and the Economics of Queues

This book deals with strategic behavior in queues, addressing questions such as whether or not to join a queue, whether to compete for priority, which server to select, when exactly to appear, or whether to renege after spending too much time waiting. Naturally, the bulk of the text deals with this first dilemma, while also examining the others in detail.The text first considers unobservable queues and then observable ones. In both cases, the issues of Nash equilibrium and social optimization are examined. It also considers regulations designed to align the two solutions and explores how profits can be made.The topic of strategic behavior in queues is interdisciplinary, bridging queueing theory and game theory. Queueing theory provides mathematical models that evaluate the performance of various types of queues, while game theory deals with situations in which one's outcome is not only a function of one's own actions, but also of the actions of others. Indeed, one is better off staying in line if others are impatient and clear the way, whereas otherwise one may consider abandoning the queue.